We quantify the effect of refinancing risk on euro area money market spreads, a major factor driving spreads during the financing crisis. With the advent of the crisis, market participants' perception of their ability to refinance over a given period of time changed radically. As a result, borrowers preferred to obtain funding for longer tenors and lenders were willing to provide funding for shorter tenors. This discrepancy resulted in a need to refinance more frequently in order to borrow ove r a given horizon, thus increasing refinancing risk. We measure refinancing risk by quantifying the sensitivity of the spread to the refinancing frequency. In order to do so we introduce a model to price EURIBOR-based money market spreads vis-à-vis the overnight index swap. We adopt a methodology akin to a factor model in which the parameters determining the spreads are the intensity of the crisis, its expected half-life, and the sensitivity of spreads to the refinancing frequency. Results suggest that refinancing risk affects the spread significantly across time, albeit in a largely varying manner. Central bank interventions have reduced the spreads as well as the effect of refinancing risk on them.
Introduction
Following August 2007, money market rates changed their behavior dramatically. 1 A positive wedge appeared among money market rates with the same maturity but different floating-leg frequencies (Morini, 2009; Ametrano and Bianchetti, 2009; Mercurio, 2010) . For example, a three-month deposit rate shot up compared with a three-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate, creating a spread that became the main policy reference for the intensity of the financial crisis. Similarly, a six-month deposit rate rose higher compared with alternative strategies for borrowing money for six months, such as a combination of a three-month deposit rate and a forward rate agreement (FRA) for three months, three months ahead (see chart 1). In circles of policymakers, academics, and central bankers, t he question of what was driving the spreads sprang up vigorously in debates over how to tackle the rising spreads.
Chart 1: Six-month deposit spread versus a combination of a three-month deposit spread and a three-month on three-month FRA spread
Note: The chart presents the evolution of the six-month EURIBOR-OIS spread and a combination of the three-month EURIBOR-OIS spread and a three-month FRA-OIS spread, three months ahead. Source: Reuters and authors' calculations.
This paper argues that the main driver of the spreads was the risk of not being able to access the market to refinance at some future point in time -or, more simply, the risk of refinancing. In other words, what changed after the crisis was the perception of money market participants about their future ability to re -access the market. This change created a preference among lenders to refinance at shorter horizons and among borrowers to refinance at longer horizons. As a result, in order to obtain financing for a given period, borrowers needed to either access the markets more frequently or face a premium to avoid it. We argue that the differences in preferences between lenders and borrowers regarding refinancing frequency became a major driver of the spreads. We then measure the sensitivity of the spread to the refinancing frequency: The higher the sensitivity is, the higher the spread is, as the premium to avoid refinancing rises. The measure of sensitivity becomes our measure of refinancing risk.
In order to demonstrate the importance of the refinancing risk, a deeper understanding of the money market's functioning before and after the crisis is useful.
Consider the spreads (EURIBOR-based rates versus the OIS) in chart 1. They represent two alternative strategies for borrowing money for six months: One would borrow money upfront for six months at the six-month deposit rate, and the other would borrow money for three months at the three-month deposit rate and lock in the rate for the remaining three months by entering into a FRA. The second strategy would entail entering the market again in three months for a second three-month period. This is because the FRA contract, being merely an agreement on rates and therefore an unfunded contract, would not commit the lender to lending the actual amount of money to the borrower for the second three-month period. The borrower would need to re-enter the market in three months and refinance for another three 4 months. The FRA contract would hedge interest rate risk away completely for the second three-month period, but it would not hedge away the risk of not being able to re-enter the market in three months. Overall, in this simple strategy the refinancing need arises once, after the first three-month period has elapsed, and it creates a refinancing risk that is not hedged away.
Before the crisis, such access would have been taken for granted, and the existence of different implicit refinancing legs would not have been priced; that is, the refinancing risk would have been zero. However, the crisis introduced a change in the risk perceptions of market access in the two strategies. Borrowers were willing to pay a premium in order to obtain liquidity for a given horizon with as few refinancing legs as possible, thus avoiding the risk of not being able to access the market at a later point; that is, borrowers wanted to avoid refinancing risk.
Consequently, once refinancing risk was priced, the six -month deposit, which does not involve refinancing, shot up compared with the alternative strategy, which involves refinancing once.
The effect of different refinancing legs on the spreads, although important in the crisis, has not yet been measured. This paper fills this gap by introducing a pricing model for money market spreads that also measures the effect of the refinancing frequency on the spread, thus measuring the risk of refinancing.
The building block of the proposed pricing model is the "instantaneous forward spread," which represents the expectation at the current time for the price of a commitment at a future time to lend money for an infinitesimally short period at some time further ahead. The price of this commitment is expressed, in our case, in terms of a spread from a baseline rate. This definition is flexible because a ny observed spread (in our case, a EURIBOR-based spread over the OIS rate) can then 5 be calculated as a sum of the elementary building blocks over the relevant period and over the different refinancing tenors that this period may involve.
The functional form of the instantaneous forward spread is akin to a factor model. It is parsimonious, yet it reflects empirical regularities of the spread and also captures the fact that higher refinancing tenors result in smaller spreads (for example, the spread between a one-year and a six-month swap rate is higher than that between a one-year and a one-month swap rate). In order to do that, the functional form allows the refinancing tenors to form distinct blocks. These blocks together determine the shape and size of the spread. To the extent that the refinancing blocks remain distinct, the frequency of refinancing affects the spread.
The flexibility of the functional form relies on three parameters, which relate to each other in a multiplicative manner. The first, α, captures the intensity of the crisis and can be seen as a broad measure of marketwide, systemic tensions. The multiplicative relationship among implies that the remaining parameters, β and γ, only matter when α is positive-in other words, this model is for a crisis.
The second, β, determines the extent to which the different refinancing legs form distinct blocks, thus capturing the sensitivity of the spread to the refinancing frequency. As the sensitivity rises, refinancing increasingly affects the spread.
Therefore, the higher the sensitivity, the higher both the risk of refinancing and the spread would become.
Finally, the third parameter, γ, captures the expected length of the crisis in terms of half-lives. This is the first attempt, to the best of our knowledge, to produce an endogenously determined measure for the expected length of the crisis and the identification of its most intense periods. Up until now, crisis periods were mainly 6 identified based on the calendar days of relevant events. As the crisis period stretched over time, particularly in the euro area with the advent of the sovereign crisis, there was no mechanical way to establish the relative importance of the various events on money market sentiment. Our parameter, γ fills this gap.
The intuition and methodology of this paper, while novel, do relate to previous literature. The idea of using the instantaneous forward spread as a building block for our model relates to standard yield-pricing models, in which the zero-coupon yield is an equally weighted average of forward rates. Given the forward curve, any coupon bond can be priced as the sum of the present values of the future coupon and principal. The difference in this paper lies in the functional form, which essentially maps a three-dimensional space (spread, time of entry into the contract, and time to maturity), whereas the typical yield curve maps a two -dimensional space (rate and time to maturity). The proposed formula also reveals parameters with characteristics that are different from those in standard yield curve pricing.
Furthermore, a number of models have attempted to rationalize the existence of the spreads with reference to a credit premium, a liquidity premium, or both using regression analysis. Evidence in favor of one or the other type of risk is mixed. Most models in the literature conclude that both credit and liquidity factors were behind the increase in risk premiums in the interbank money market during the financial crisis. Some papers find a stronger role for credit factors (Morini, Indeed, in this paper we abstract from identifying the relative effect of liquidity risk versus credit risk and focus instead on refinanc ing risk, which we consider the major driver of the spreads. We measure refinancing risk directly from the underlying data based on characteristics specific to money markets. The results are time varying, thus providing information about the evolution of refinancing risk in the various phases of the crisis and the role of the central banks in denting it.
Moreover, in our case, refinancing risk relates to both liquidity and credit risk.
More precisely, refinancing risk is typically directly related to liq uidity risk, but under certain circumstances it may also be affected by counterparty credit risk (see section 3). We elaborate on these circumstances: In summary, we suggest that when credit risk affects the EURIBOR-panel banks in an asymmetric manner (that is, when some banks are more likely than others to drop from the panel at some point in the future), there is an option value for the lender to extending lending piecewise, and credit risk affects the frequency of refinancing. On the other hand, when cre dit risk affects the EURIBOR-panel banks in a relatively symmetric manner, there is a parallel increase in the spreads across instruments while the frequency of refinancing remains unaffected by the increase in the spreads.
Our definition of refinancing risk is linked to the theoretical literature on rollover risk. He and Xiong (2012a) Results suggest that the proposed model prices market spreads very closely.
Parameter α appears to broadly track the intensity of the crisis, recording its largest spikes at the beginning of the crisis, when Lehman Brothers fell, and during the euroarea crisis period. Parameter β suggests that, throughout the crisis, the frequency of refinancing had a strong effect on the spreads. However, the effect almost disappears at the period of the Lehman collapse. We argue that the collapse of Lehman led to an increase in all observed money market spreads due to increased overall credit risk in a manner that effectively muted the effect of the refinancing frequency on the spread. In other words, in a situation where markets freeze due to overall heightened credit risk, it is of little relevance whether lending is extended piecewise or not. On the contrary, our results suggest that during the European crisis, the effect of the refinancing frequency was higher, probably because the credit risk of certain institutions was affected more than other institutions, thus increasing the scope for 1) the borrower could borrow the money unsecured for six months (at the six-month EURIBOR), or 2) the borrower could borrow the money unsecured for only three months (at the three-month EURIBOR) and, at the same time, lock in the rate for the remaining three months of the six-month period by entering into a forward rate agreement.
In the second strategy, after the first three months elapsed, the borrower would repay the three-month deposit to the original lender. It would then need to enter the market again and borrow money for the three remaining months (from a potentially different lender) at the then-prevailing EURIBOR rate. It is important to clarify that the FRA is an unfunded contract that does not represent a commitment to lend money;
it is for hedging and not funding purposes. Once the borrower refinanced in the market, the FRA would hedge away the risk of the EURIBOR rate for the second three-month period. This is because the FRA would give the borrower the right to 11 receive the EURIBOR rate (which the borrower would use to pay the lender for the second three-month period) but instead pay the agreed-upon FRA rate. 4 If no risk is priced into re-borrowing the amount of money needed in three months, the two strategies would be equivalent, and arbitrage would ensure that they are consistently priced; that is, the six-month rate would be the same as the compounding of the three-month rate and the three-month FRA. In the opposite case, in which there is a risk that the borrower would not be able to refinance the loan in the market in three months, the strategy involving exchanging money upfront for the whole period of six months (only one refinancing leg) would be more costly.
Therefore, the risk of being unable to refinance could be mitigated by avoiding refinancing legs for the borrower and by inducing refinancing legs for the lender. As a result, refinancing risk would drive up the price of strategies that involve fewer refinancing legs.
Turning from theory to observation, after August 2007, a wedge appeared between the two strategies, making the six-month deposit strategy relatively more expensive. As shown in chart 1, the spread (to the OIS rate) of the six -month deposit was consistently higher than the compounding of the three-month deposit spread and the three-month FRA spread.
Such spreads presented consistent characteristics. Notably, they remained positive for a significant period ahead, suggesting that spread s were pricing actual underlying risks. Moreover, this observation was consistent across a broad spectrum of money market instruments. For example, a one-year deposit rate was higher than 12 a combination of a six-month deposit rate and a six-month FRA. The latter combination was in turn higher than a one-year swap with three-month refinancing frequencies and even higher than a one-year swap with a one-month refinancing frequency. 5 In general, the lower the refinancing frequency was, the higher the spread became.
The illustrative example shows that the frequency of refinancing matters for the spread. It is therefore important to be able to quantify its effect on the spread. In order to do that, we need to model the euro area spreads.
How does the risk of refinancing relate to liquidity risk and credit risk?
Let us consider first how the frequency of refinancing affects liquidity risk.
The link is direct: In line with definitions proposed by the literature (Diamond, 1991;  Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2013), liquidity risk relates to the risk of being unable to access the market when money is needed or, equivalently, to the risk of refinancing.
From the point of view of the borrower, liquidity risk may arise due to the inability to refinance at some point in the future, resulting for example from a market freeze, market illiquidity, or changes in the credit-worthiness of the borrower.
6 5 In general, the FRA contract can be seen as a special case of an interest rate swap (IRS) contract, and therefore a similar logic would hold: Any IRS can be reduced to a combination of a deposit and FRAs. For example, a three-month swap for one year would be priced consistently with a three-month deposit and three three-month FRAs for each consecutive three-month period. Therefore, such an IRS contract would involve four legs and would be less expensive compared with a one-year deposit, as the latter would price the fact that money has been exchanged for one year. Overall, OIS, FRA, and IRS contracts are agreements on rates only, useful to lock in the rates when combined with matching refinancing strategies aimed at obtaining longer-term financing while hedging away interest rate risk.
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Overall, in view of liquidity risk, a lender would prefer to lend piecewise; that is, to extend a loan with shorter refinancing legs. He or she would then assign higher prices to loans with less frequent refinancing legs. The reverse would happen for a borrower: The borrower would prefer to get the money for the whole period needed, rather than having to refinance within the period. This preference would create a spread between lending strategies of different refinancing legs, like the ones observed during the crisis. Therefore, liquidity risk and the risk of refinancing could be seen as synonymous.
However, as already hinted at by the example, refinancing risk can be affected by counterparty credit risk in our setting, albeit in a more subtle manner. Consid er the following setting from the point of view of the lender: A lender faces a pool of banks and updates information about their creditworthiness over time. The lender knows that a fraction of them will default after a certain period ahead -for example, between three and six months from now-but not which ones will be in the defaulting fraction. The lender expects to learn more within the first three -month period. A generic bank of this group asks the lender for a loan of six months. Would the lender prefer to offer a loan for three months instead?
In this setting, the answer would be yes. At the time when the request for lending is made, the three-month deposit would reflect the probability of default of the underlying instrument (the EURIBOR in our case) given the original pool of banks; the FRA would reflect the probability of default given the pool of yetunknown surviving banks; and the six-month deposit would reflect the probability of default given the original pool of banks over the six-month period. Therefore, in that setting, the six-month deposit would cost more than the alternative combination strategy if only credit risk was driving the spread. Overall, there is an implicit option 14 value for the lender to extend lending piecewise in order to reassess the creditworthiness of the borrower over time.
The crucial feature of the example above is the uncertainty over the number of banks that survive in the second three-month period. As the FRA is merely an unfunded bet on the EURIBOR rate in that period, it would be the surviving banks that would determine the rate. In other words, the FRA rates reflect the intensity of default of the banks in the EURIBOR panel at a future rate, while the current expectation of a three-month deposit contract three months ahead (the implied forward rate three months on three months) reflects the intensity of default of the banks that are currently (at the time the loan is requested) in the EURIBOR panel.
Consider now a different setting: A lender faces a pool of b anks and updates information about their creditworthiness over time. The lender expects that after a certain period ahead-in this example, three months-all banks may suffer a similar credit shock (for example, due to a market freeze following the collapse of a systemically relevant bank), but all would survive (for example, because all of them are the highest-quality banks). In other words, the average or generic default risk of all banks increases in the second three-month period.
In this setting, the average EURIBOR rate would increase in the second threemonth period to reflect the increased risk of default for the surviving prime banks.
The increase would be such that a combination strategy of a three -month deposit and a three-month FRA three months ahead would cost the same as a six-month deposit.
Seeing it differently, default risk would lead to a parallel increase of all rates across instruments, so that the underlying increase of the EURIBOR default risk would cancel out in the two alternative borrowing strategies and the frequency of refinancing would be irrelevant in that case. There is no option value for the lender 15 to extend lending piecewise in this setting.
The two examples above suggest that across time, depending on whether credit risk affects the pool of prime banks in an asymmetric manner, our measure of refinancing risk may or may not be affected by credit risk, but it is always affected by liquidity risk.
In practice, the pool of EURIBOR panel banks and the EURIBOR -based instruments present certain characteristics that could mitigate the (asymmetric) effect of credit risk in our measure of refinancing risk. To begin with, m oney market rates based on the EURIBOR are offer rates for generic prime banks, implying that individual credit risk should not enter into the spreads, whereas average credit risk is relatively low. 7 If the borrower is (perceived by the lender to be) a prime bankthat is, a bank of the highest credit quality-the borrower would receive the observed prime rate. Moreover, in practice, the observed FRA has a maximum maturity of six months. In that sense, the asymmetry effect relies on the perceived probability that a bank which is currently prime will cease to be prime over the next 6 months.
When such a concern becomes relevant for the pricing, the bank may not be considered as prime in the first place.
Methodology
This section defines the instantaneous forward spread, which represents the fundamental building block for the generic formula describing the spreads to the OIS rate of various instruments at specific maturities and refinancing frequencies ( section 3.1). Section 3.2 assigns a functional form to this building block in order to understand the underlying driving factors. Section 3.3 describes the fitting methodology of the actual data to the theoretical functional form.
The generalized formula of spreads to the OIS rate
The building block of a generic formula of the spreads should have a convenient, flexible, and practical representation. The instantaneous forward spread serves this purpose. It represents the expectation at the current time, t, for the price (rate) of a commitment at time t1 to lend money unsecured for an infinitesimal amount of time at a later time t2, where t ≤ t1 ≤ t2, at a rate that is the EONIA plus a spread η. The instantaneous forward spread is denoted as ηt(τ1,τ2), where τ2 = t2 -t is the time to maturity of the contract and τ1 = t1 -t is the duration until the date of the commitment. This representation gives us the shortest possible maturity for any spread and is the building block from which any other spread in the market can be derived by integrating the instantaneous forward rate over the period t2 -t1. Indeed, the later sections present the cases of a deposit, an FRA, a forward, and a swap.
Moreover, the instantaneous forward spread has certain properties . Namely, it is bound by zero in the sense that ηt(τ1,τ1) = ηt(τ2,τ2) = 0, because immediate settlements do not entail a premium. It is positive because it can be considered an insurance premium. It is increasing with t2, as uncertainty increases with time to maturity. Moreover, the shape of the function is similar for the various times to settlement (τ1). Overall, it is dimensionally homogeneous to an interest rate or a spread and can therefore be measured in percentage points or in basis points. Notably, the functional form captures the fact that, as the refinancing frequency declines (that is, as refinancing becomes more infrequent), the spreads of money market rates over the OIS rate increase, suggesting that borrowers are willing to pay a premium in order to avoid more frequent refinancing. It also explains why, in overnight segments, the premium is minimal. Figure 2 presents this behavior graphically for given values of parameters a, β, and γ, and for various refinancing frequencies. Regarding the three parameters, each of them has a clear interpretation .
Parameter α
Parameter α provides a rough measure of the level shift which affects all levels in a similar manner and thus the intensity of the marketwide tension. It can be seen 19 as a broad measure of the systemic, overall market tensions in the sense that, as α rises, the premia also rise across the cross section of our chosen money market instruments. It is therefore a measure of market distress. Figure 3 depicts spreads for different values of the parameter α (1, 0.5, and 0.25). As expected, the bigger the spreads, the higher the intensity of the market distress and thus the higher the parameter α. 
Parameter β
Parameter β governs the effect of the refinancing frequency on the spreads. In practice, β governs the concavity of the function and therefore the degree to which the various refinancing legs appear distinctly and the extent to which they affect the spread.
When β = 1, the refinancing frequency fully determines the shape of the spread. As shown in the top-left panel of figure 4 , for β = 1 and for a refinancing frequency equal to 4, the total premium is the sum of four distinct segments .
As β approaches zero (ceteris paribus), these segments gradually decline and 20 eventually morph into a rectangular shape when β = 0. In the extreme case, in which the spread is the same irrespective of the refinancing frequency, the spread is constant over time, which is akin to a constant hazard rate of default. If α is positive, credit risk alone should be driving the spread, irrespective of the refinancing frequency. This is the visualization of a credit risk increase affecting all prime banks in a broadly symmetric manner, as explained in section 2.2. Overall, as parameter β declines from 1 to 0, the effect of the refinancing frequency on the spread fades. 
Parameter γ
Parameter γ captures the decay of the intensity of the turmoil in the period leading up to the maturity of the contract, or the "implied expected length" of the turmoil. As parameter γ increases, the implied length of the turmoil declines, as 21 spreads are expected to revert to zero faster. Parameter γ, when transformed into half-lives, gives a real-time approximation of the expected length of the crisis. Note that parameter γ was modeled with built-in expectations that the crisis would fade over time. We assume that markets are optimistic and consider that good times are long lasting, whereas shocks are transient, in line with the literature on financial crises (Brusco and Castiglionesi, 2007) . In this sense, lower half-lives suggest that the stress will dissipate faster and indicate a period of stress. Figure 5 shows the behavior of the spread for different values of parameter γ.
As parameter γ increases, the spread declines faster (that is, it converges faster to the OIS rate). The model has been developed to analyze the behavior of spreads during the financial turmoil. Before the turmoil, these spreads were negligible, and therefore the variation in the data was not sufficient to identify our parameters. Indeed, in normal circumstances (that is, when α is almost zero), the refinancing frequency is not an issue because liquidity risk and the decay of the intensity of the turmoil are essentially irrelevant. Therefore, the values of the parameters β and γ are meaningful only when a is not close or equal to zero. Namely, for a = 0, ηt(τ1,τ2) = 0 for any 22 value of the β and γ parameters.
Fitting the data to the functional form
In order to fit the empirical data in the theoretical functional form, we minimized the sum of the squared differences between the actual data and the theoretical data. The actual data are the market-observed spreads, as discussed in .) The weights assigned to each instrument or group of instruments in this minimization problem were chosen on the basis of (inter alia) their market liquidity and maturity. In this exercise, we tried assigning both an equal weight of unity and weights based on liquidity considerations. 8 8 There are good reasons to weight instruments in an asymmetric manner. Apart from the fact that some instruments may convey more accurate information than others because they are more liquid, assigning weights adds flexibility in our model. For example we may wish to restrict the experiment to some subfamily of EURIBOR-linked instruments that do not include futures contracts, as the latter are not traded over the counter, or that exclude deposit rates, on the basis that they are not derivatives. This restriction is easily implemented by the respective weighting of the available EURIBOR instruments. In order to ascertain that the results, however, were not driven by the choice of weights, we relied on the notion of Shannon's entropy. Any weighting scheme can be changed proportionally without changing the difference between the actual and theoretical values given by formula F, and, by making the scheme sum to unity, it can appear as a probability distribution on the discrete set of available instruments. Such a probability 23 The value of F following the solution to this minimization problem provides a measure of the goodness of fit of our model. It is measured in basis points, as it refers to spreads. For example, a value of 7 basis points indicates the typical deviation in basis points of the theoretically constructed spread from the actual one .
We used this value to assess the goodness of fit of our model.
Following the estimation of a, β, and γ parameters, a number of transformations were undertaken in order to express a and γ in percentage points. 
Data and data manipulations
The data set comprises money market rates on EURIBOR -and EONIA-linked instruments. In the family of the EURIBOR-linked instruments, we also included the unsecured deposit rates of a maturity longer than one day, as they are the underlying of the EURIBOR fixing-that is, the instruments that are supposedly represented by that EURIBOR fixing. The other instruments included the derivative instruments that are cash settled on the EURIBOR-namely, the FRAs; the swap against one-month, three-month, and six-month EURIBOR; and the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (or LIFFE) futures contracts on three-month EURIBOR. Within the EONIA-linked instruments, we included the distribution has an entropy, which, in the case of this paper, should be higher than 3.
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one-day deposit rate and EONIA swaps that range from one week to 30 years.
Overall, the data comprise 78 different instruments and range from one-day to 10-year maturities. We used data from every instrument that was recorded in the market Draghi, in which he vowsed to do "whatever it takes" to save the euro. 10 5. Results
Descriptive statistics and goodness of fit
The functional form chosen provides a very good fit of the observed spreads . This is a period confound with confusion by practitioners over the correct modelling procedure. Our results reflect the difficulty prevailing in the market at that time of pricing the instruments involved, given the new, unprecedented situation : There were inconsistencies in market pricing, which enhanced high volatility in the explanatory parameters beyond the effect of the turmoil.
Behavior of parameters
Looking at the behavior of our estimated a, β, and γ period by period, we gain a plausible intuition on the crisis (chart 2, panels a, b, and c). Overall, the evolution of α appears to track the intensity of the crisis quite well . Parameter α recorded relatively small values before the turmoil, in line with low market tensions. underlying fear of the euro breakup. 12 It is interesting that the value of the parameter remains positive, suggesting a "new normal" situation for money markets after 2007.
Three features in the behavior of β deserve attention. First, the parameter always remains above zero, hovering around 0.6 on average. This result clearly suggests that there is considerable concavity in the ηt(τ1,τ2) function; therefore, the effect of refinancing frequency on the spreads is always present and is quite strong.
Second, following the default of Lehman, β drops to its lowest point, close to zero.
This result is consistent with a market freeze prevailing in that period due to increased credit risk across markets. Our interpretation is that, following the collapse of Lehman, the average credit risk for all Euribor panel banks increased in a broadly symmetric manner, leading to an almost parallel shift in spreads across instruments without affecting the refinancing frequency. This is represented in figure 4 as the rise in the rectangular part when β is low. Third, β recorded a couple of significant drops during the euro-area crisis, but on average, its values were significantly higher compared with the beginning of the turmoil and the Lehman collapse. This could be viewed as the result of credit risk asymmetrically affecting the Euribor panel banks during that period, given that certain panel banks were more exposed to the crisis than others (due to the exposur e of their sovereigns). The asymmetry would increase the option value of the lender for piecewise lending and therefore increase the effect of the refinancing frequency on the spread. operation) divided by the outstanding excess liquidity (EL) 13 . On the days where no operations took place, the value of these variables is zero. Four variables are constructed in this manner, two for the three-and six-month operations and another two for the one-and three-year operations. We look at specific operations and standardize them by the level of outstanding EL so as to maintain the relative order of magnitude for the operations conducted, as some of them (for example, the first one-year LTRO and the first three-year LTRO) were considered more important than others because of their large participation. The end-of-maintenance-period dates are deleted from the sample so as to "clean" the EL series from the end-of-period effect.
We also construct a dummy taking the value of 1 for every FRFA operation conducted in that period, including the one-month operations but not the weekly liquidity-providing operations. The chosen regression models separately regress parameters a * and β on their first lag and relevant variables. Table presents regression results from regressing parameter α* on its lagged value, a constant and various (dummy) variables. Specification A includes a dummy for all Long-term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) conducted by the ECB. Specification B includes a variable with the amount of liquidity injected by the 3-month LTROs on the days when such LTROs were conducted, divided by the prevailing excess liquidity on those days and zero otherwise (D_3mLTRO). Specification C includes a variable with the amount of liquidity injected by the 6-month LTROs on the days when such LTROs were conducted, divided by the prevailing excess liquidity on those days and zero otherwise (D_6mLTRO). Specification D includes a variable with the amount of liquidity injected by the 1-year LTROs on the days when such LTROs were conducted, divided by the prevailing excess liquidity on those days and zero otherwise (D_1yLTRO). Specification E includes a variable with the amount of liquidity injected by the 3-year LTROs on the days when such LTROs were conducted, divided by the prevailing excess liquidity on those days and zero otherwise (D_3yLTRO). EL is the sum of liquidity provided (via open market operations and the SMP programme) minus the total liquidity withdrawn (via autonomous factors and reserve requirements). It is measured in millions of euros. Amounts of liquidity injected by the various operations are also measured in millions of euros. Sample period runs from 15 September 2008 to 31 March 2013 for all but specification E, when the sample starts on 15 September 2011. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
6 Conclusion
This paper is the first to quantify the effect of the refinancing frequency on the spread, a major factor behind the money market spreads during the financ ial crisis. What changed with the advent of the crisis was essentially the perceptions about the ability to refinance. Therefore, money market rates of the same maturity, but with different refinancing tenors, were priced differently for the first time.
Borrowers were willing to pay a premium to obtain financing for an extended period rather than having to refinance several times.
This paper proposes a model that measures the effect of the frequency of refinancing on the spread. This is done by modeling the whole surface of observed Euribor-based money market spreads over all maturities and commitment periods ahead. The information contained in this very rich money market data set is summarized into three parameters, which evolve over time. In this respect, the proposed model is akin to a factor model. The three parameters reflect the marketwide intensity of the crisis, the effect of the refinancing frequency on the spread, and the implied duration of the turmoil expressed in half-lives. As the effect of the refinancing frequency on the spread increases, refinancing risk becomes more important in driving the spread. The importance of refinancing risk can vary over time.
This paper also elaborates on the link between refinancing risk, liquidity, and credit risk. Refinancing risk is affected by liquidity risk and, under certain circumstances, also by (counterparty) credit risk. Crucially, when credit risk is expected to affect certain market participants more than others, there is an option 36 value for the lender in extending loans for shorter horizons in order to assess the creditworthiness of the counterpart across time. In that case, the refinancing frequency is affected by credit risk. On the contrary, when credit risk is expected to increase across instruments and panel banks in a symmetric manner, the refinancing frequency is not affected by credit risk.
The featured model produces a number of interesting results . First, the proposed simple and parsimonious model achieves a good fit of the observed d ata.
Second, it provides evidence that refinancing risk was always present during the crisis. However, in the period following Lehman's collapse, the sensitivity of the spread to the refinancing frequency drops considerably, consistent with a market freeze. On the other hand, refinancing risk appears relatively higher during the European crisis compared with previous periods, as certain panel banks were affected more than others. Third, the model offers a novel, endogenously determined measure for the expected length of the crisis and the identification of its most intense periods.
According to this measure, the euro area crisis and the fear of a break -up of the euro affected euro area money markets in a similarly grave manner as the money market crisis stemming from the US in 2007 and 2008. Finally, it appears that central bank interventions have a negative effect on the spreads by lowering refinancing risk.
